Corporate Governance: Theories and Hypothesis

Agency theory and corporate governance
Corporate governance is not relevant in a world without agency cost. It is relevant if and only if there is agency cost and incomplete contract (Olive Hart, 1996) . Who makes residual decision and how to govern firms efficiently comprise the main tasks of corporate governance.
Agency theory 1 provides a framework to analyze the effects of separation of ownership and control, and provides effective tools to solve the principal-agent problem generated by conflicts of interests 2 . Under an effective governance system, the board and the executive management are expected to act according to their best judgment on corporate affairs, this does not guarantee a perfect match with outside shareholders' interests 3 . Conflicts of interests between controlling owners as agents and other shareholders as principal generate agency costs that both parties as rational self-interested people have incentives to reduce in order to generate firm value. Agency theory provides a general structure therein a variety of classes of solutions to these problems contain. Empirical studies drawn from corporate practices have provided examples of linkage between corporate governance and value creation. It has enriched the theory and practices of corporate governance 4 . Jensen and Meckling (1994) Power is a common good that derives positive utility for the individual possessing it.
Jensen-Meckling Model: REMM model 5 of human behaviour
Voting rights are power to run the firm. There is a market for power and an equilibrium price for it in order for the "power market" to function well. Exchange of the power should be priced in terms of the amount of power being transferred, the resulting power structure and the total value of the firm after the transaction. In general, the higher the expected benefit of power, the higher the market price of power 6 . There are cases where the power is locked in and not subject to contest, e.g., extreme cases where firms have an absolute controlling owner (s). This provides room for corporate governance improvements and market disciplinary forces to work, e.g., shareholder activism, market pricing mechanism.
It is widely recognized that active owner control and entrepreneurship in Sweden have contributed to a major industry boom and laid foundation for long-term economic growth in Sweden (Rolf Carlsson, 2001 ). An absolute controlling owner in this case is not that controlling at all. He or she often takes into account of others' interests other than his or her private benefits 7 , sometimes even counter his or her private benefits for the benefit of the firm. There obviously exists altruistic behavior during the early stages much like parents nurture young child. REM model is therefore relevant in explaining the Swedish case.
In this paper, active owners' strategic decision of voting scheme change is evaluated under the framework of shareholder wealth redistribution, the power redistribution of the owners and the implicit trade-offs. The trade-off is made through exchanging sufficiently big amount of power with sufficiently big amount of other goods: management's inner propensity to thrive for excellence, improve outside shareholder relationship, to compete for capital, to comply with domestic and international rules, and to re-balance portfolio composition of the main owners. This study also has policy implications on the issue of facilitating the market for corporate control. EU proposal of one-share one-vote has met strong resistance from countries with dual-class of shares notably Sweden 8 for the concern that a uniform one-share one-vote would change the current Swedish corporate power structure and ownership of the large Swedish firms which can be potentially harmful for Swedish national interests. In addition, this study provides a unique method in using power index to quantify the controlling shareholders change of power and its economic value.
Model of owner control
Consider a model of ownership and control. A strong owner owns a majority of votes and can decide on all the important issues concerning a firm. He has reputation capital (R) and social capital (S), which restricts him from harming the firm. His utility function is twice differentiable and concave. U i =U(S) +U(R) +U(V) + U(H) where V is the votes, and H is the income stream he gets from his shareholdings and i denotes the owner.
At each period, the controlling owner convinces the stockholders to entrust their funds to him by promising to increase the value of the firm. When the firm performs well, the other shareholders are quiet. But when the firm performs bad, the other shareholders investigate by going through company accounts and/or sell their shares. Under such situation, the share price falls and he decides to give some control rights back. If he gives the votes for free, he will gain some social capital and reputation capital d(S)+d(R) but lose his voting power d(V). And the value of the voting change will be equally spread over both the A and B share owners. If he demands fair compensation, he will be compensated for the value of the votes he gives up according to the market value of the votes. The change of his social capital and reputation capital is 0.
Evaluate the voting change
Electrolux AB and SKF AB were two of the core holdings of the well-known Swedish family, the Wallenberg Sphere 9 . Wallenberg family exercises active ownership through its holding company Investor 10 .
Active owner control adds value to the firm, but absolute control using voting difference decreases the value of the firm through the power discount. Thus, the economic value of reducing voting difference is expected to be positive because it is viewed as a corporate 
In reality there can be negative voting premium as in case of SKF, where we set the compensation as 0. The negative premium can be due to lack of trading interest in A shares.
The new voting structure of A and B shareholding is (V a , V b ), V a is the proportion of the total vote assigned to A shares, V b is the proportion of the total vote assigned to B shares. SKF has a negative premium during the period indicating a 0 premium (see graph 7 in attachment). However the amount of compensation to the loss of the voting power should be, the actual compensation of A-share holders of both companies is none. An arbitrageur would make money by selling his B shares and buys A share for the same amount of investment, and end up making a gain after the voting scheme change. Since the premium is expected to be larger after the voting change.
Methodology
We employ clinical study (R. H. Carlsson, 2000) methods to the two events of voting scheme changes. Clinical study method is best suited when few observations are available 12 . We use stock market value change as the measure to the economic value of the voting change. The market model is used to estimate the economic gains (Appendix A:
Event Study Methodology).
The power of the controlling owner is calculated by Shapley-Shubik power indices 
Each swing is given a weight of 12 The depth of discussion often offsets the defects of lack of statistical significance.
The difference of these two indices are that Banzhaf Power indices calculate how many times the voter can swing and change the winning coalition to a losing one. We use standard Banzhaf indices where all the power indices assigned to voters in the game sum up to 1. Shapley indices calculate how many times the voter are pivotal in all possible permutations of a winning coalition. Note that the voting game described here is noncooperative.
The case of Electrolux
Electrolux AB and SKF AB, implemented voting scheme changes in 1998 and 1999 respectively. The voting difference after change complies with the Swedish Company Act which set the highest voting difference to 1: 1/10 among common stocks. From inside, Investor AB needed to minimize its power discount imposed on its net asset value. The discount was estimated at about 14% of Investor's net asset value as of Feb. the 10 th , 1998, a phenomenon usually associated with mutual funds. To reach its goal of shrinking and eventually eliminate the power discount, Investor has resorted to increase its overall risk and concentrate on major holdings and its core competence area. This, however, has not worked to reduce the power discount. One way to change that image is to lower the power distance of the dual-class of shares. If that is the goal then the effort is bitterly failed since the level of the power discount has increased to around 30% of its net asset value as of year 2001. However the risk tied up to Investor is more related to information asymmetry, meaning that there can be highly risky investments, that is, out of balance sheet activities and agency cost associated with control.
Background study
Public opinion perceived the almost non-existent voting rights of B shares as increasingly negative, particularly investors in the international market 17 .
After the change, the company's voting scheme would be brought in line with the current Swedish Company Act which allows 1 to 1:10 voting difference. The liquidity of the Ashares would also improve partly due to the expected additional demand to the higher voting shares, partly due to the prospect of an outsider gaining a corner position in the company. All factors considered it was in favor of the change of the voting scheme. We expect the change of the voting scheme have a positive effect on the price movement of Electrolux shares.
Market reaction to the news
According to the press release of March 10, 1998 t=0 t=1
The announcement of the agenda March, 10 th .
t=-1
The effect has been built up since the release of the agenda of the annual shareholder meeting given that the board's proposal had a good chance to be endorsed by the ASM.
This has largely been priced in the stock by the time it was confirmed. Conditional event methodology 19 should be applied here. This would mean that the effect at the announcement day ought to be not as strong as what it would have been had it been a totally unexpected event.
Graph 1 shows the stock price movement of Electrolux around the event period.
The data has been modified to calculate the model parameters 20 since the trading volume of A-shares was extremely thin and un-continuous. This phenomenon was due to the fact that 18 A qualified majority of both A and B shares were required at the AGM. 19 Prabhala, 1997. 20 The no trading day data has been filled by smoothing out the two nearest trading price. 
The loss of control analysis using Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices
A simple voting ratio and a power indices measure of voting rights of the shareholders are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 . It is obvious that the voting power of the controlling owner has reduced from absolute voting control (power equals to 1) to a block voter meaning any winning coalition would include the controlling owner (Burgin and Shapley, 2000). 1. Data source is Ägarna och Makten, 1998.
2.MWC stands for minimal winning coalition.
Overall, Investor's decision to eliminate the extreme type of voting scheme, a big step towards one-share one-vote system received much credit from the public. It was nevertheless a calculated move since it would not lose control in the near term even though an absolute control was replaced with a veto control ( Nevertheless, the possibility of an outside interest for acquiring a corner position in the company has increased as shown by the increased voting premium (see graph 1). This is consistent with Rydqvist Kristian (1996) that the voting premium increases as the power of the biggest owner decreases. Table 3 shows the abnormal return of the 11-day window and the significance of the abnormal return around the release of the news of the voting scheme change. The sample period is 250 days before the event period. The market model is used to estimate the estimated normal return by using the sample period standard deviation to calculate the event day standard deviation conditioned on the market return. The abnormal return is calculated and a significance test is performed.
Interpretation of the regression result
There were significant event period gains as shown in Table 3 
The case of SKF
Background study
The other two firms in Sweden having the extreme voting scheme were SKF (Aktiebologet Svenska Kullagerfabriken) and Ericsson (L.M.Ericsson). SKF AB reversed the extreme voting scheme in 1999 after being rejected by the controlling owner Investor at 1998 ASM.
A little less-known fact is that the major owner vetoed the proposal of a free converting right from A-share to B-share. The market's perception of the governance condition of the firm is an important factor. It directly related to the perceived value of the firm undergone governance structure changes.
The bigger the voting pattern changes, the larger the market reaction to the change. It would be prudent to say that the abnormal return experienced on the day of the announcement was due to partly the changes of the ownership arrangement and partly the first quarter report that turned out to be not as bad as the market believed. SKF had experienced large loss over 1998, but returned to profit the first quarter of 1999 22 . In addition, a dividend of 2 SEK was proved by the ASM corresponding to a 61,9% fall comparing to the year before (i.e. 5,25 per share for the year 1997).
Graph 2 shows the stock price movement of SKF around the event period. Note that SKF A shares has a negative premium over B shares at the time period of the voting changes (see graph 7 in attachment). 22 The original words of the press release commented on the first quarter report was: "the sales are still declining at the SKF's main markets, the bottom of the business cycle has not yet been reached. In Asia, however, SKF sales have started to grow again". 1 9 9 9 -0 3 -1 9 1 9 9 9 -0 4 -0 3 1 9 9 9 -0 4 -1 8 1 9 9 9 -0 5 -0 3 1 9 9 9 -0 5 -1 8 1 9 9 9 -0 6 -0 2 1 9 9 9 -0 6 -1 7 1 9 9 9 -0 7 -0 2 Event day-99-4-22
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The change was announced at the 1999 ASM, on 22 nd April. An 11-day event window is chosen including the event day, 5-day before and after the event day. The sample period is 250 trading days before the event window. The market reaction to the event at the event period conditional on the market return of the event period is tested using the market model. The general index of the SSE is chosen to be the bench mark index. Table 5 shows the abnormal return of the 11-day window and the significance of the abnormal return. Table 5 The effect of voting scheme change on APRIL 22nd, 1999
as evaluated by the sample period 250 trading days before the event period. 
day window
The loss of control analysis
However, the change of the voting ownership is not significant by measures of power indices. Wallenberg sphere weakly dominate other parties.
A simple voting ratio and a power indices analysis of the voting rights of the shareholders are presented in Table 4 and Table 6 , respectively. 
A: The standard event study methodology and its development
This paper employs the market model of event study to assess the economic impact of a voting scheme change to the value of firm. The estimation procedure is described below.
A standard market value framework For a given firm, I, we consider a date t, occurring during an event period as well as an estimation period containing T observations distinct from the event period. The abnormal return A it for the date t is computed as
Where the parameters of the equation are obtained using the estimation period data. Since R it =α+βR mt +ε it the abnormal return in (1) can be written as
The variance-covariance matrix of the market model coefficients is (conditioned on the market returns):
Combining (2) and (3) 
